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Abstract
This paper examines the role of currency and banking in the German financial
crisis of 1931 for both Germany and the U.S. We specify a structural dynamic
factor model to identify financial and monetary factors separately for each
of the two economies. We find that monetary transmission through the Gold
Standard played only a minor role in causing and propagating the crisis, while
financial distress was important. We also find evidence of crisis propagation
from Germany to the U.S. via the banking channel. Banking distress in both
economies was apparently not endogenous to monetary policy. Results confirm
Bernanke’s (1983) conjecture that an independent, non-monetary financial
channel of crisis propagation was operative in the Great Depression.
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Crisis? What Crisis?
Currency vs. Banking in the Financial Crisis of 1931
1 Introduction
Between 1929 and 1932, national output in the U.S. and Germany declined in unison,
earlier and more strongly than in most other industrialized nations (see the data in
Barro and Ursu´a, 2008). The two economies were heavily exposed to each other,
both through financial markets and the Gold Standard. German commercial debt
owed directly and indirectly to the U.S. exceeded 10% of U.S. GDP in 1931. German
reparations, owed indirectly to the U.S. through inter-allied loans from WW1 for
which they served as collateral, again exceeded 10% of U.S. 1931 GDP. Both classes
of debt were lost almost entirely between 1931 and 1933 (Schuker, 1988). The trigger
event for this was the Austro-German financial crisis of July 1931. In a matter of
days, it led to the nationalization of Germany’s five largest banks, the suspension
of gold convertibility, the introduction of capital controls, and a moratorium on
reparations (see James, 1986, for an account of events).
Schnabel (2004) highlighted the vulnerability of German banks as a main cause
of the 1931 crisis, identifying lack of equity and high exposure to short-term foreign
credit as key factors. The weak position of Germany’s banks had been inherited
from the stabilization after the hyperinflation of 1923, which was strongly based on
U.S. credit.
The 1931 financial crisis was also the first major crisis of the interwar Gold
Standard, and effectively marked the beginning of its breakdown. Doubts about the
credibility of Germany’s commitment to the Gold Standard, as well as its ability to
defend its currency, were emphasized by Eichengreen (1992) and Temin (1989).
Moreover, the financial crisis of 1931 was a foreign debt and reparation crisis.
Large foreign borrowing under the favorable terms of the Dawes Plan between 1924
and 1929 had diluted the value of reparation claims. Stricter terms for reparation
payments under the Young Plan helped to dry out further lending to Germany and
led to a policy of fiscal austerity (Ritschl, 2002b). Dwindling domestic support for
this policy in early 1931 triggered doubts about Germany’s willingness and ability
to pay further reparations, which contributed to the outbreak of the crisis.
Scholars have long emphasized the fact that both Germany’s financial system
and its foreign public debt were mainly underwritten by the U.S., see Kindleberger
(1973) and in particular, Schuker (1988). This would make spillover effects of Ger-
many’s crisis on the U.S. seem plausible. Following Friedman and Schwartz (1963),
historians have seen the financial crises of 1931 as one link in a chain of events
that helped to turn the U.S. recession after 1929 into a catastrophic recession (see
Temin, 1989). Bernanke (1983) argued that these financial crises operated as an
independent, non-monetary channel of crisis transmission and propagation during
the Great Depression.
The present paper is about identifying this financial channel and assessing its
importance in aggravating the Great Depression in 1931. We employ dynamic factor
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analysis (DFA) to aggregate the information in a large number of financial, mon-
etary, and real time series from both the U.S. and Germany. Our choice of the
U.S./Germany comparison is motivated both by the dominant role of the U.S. as
the anchor of the interwar gold standard and the high mutual financial exposure of
the U.S. and Germany. We provide structure to the factor model by exclusion re-
strictions on the factor loadings. For each country, we specify a currency component,
a banking factor, and a real component separately. The first is designed to capture
monetary transmission channels under the Gold Standard, which would be in line
with more traditional interpretations of the 1931 crisis as first- or second-generation
currency crisis (as in Eichengreen, 1992 or Temin, 2008). The banking component
is designed to a measure of financial distress, reflecting views of the German 1931
crisis as a banking crisis by Schumpeter (1939), Born (1967) and James (1986), or
more recently, as a third generation twin crisis (see Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998,
and the ensuing literature) by Schnabel (2004) and Adalet (2005).
The presence of identified common components in both countries allows us to
examine their dynamic relationships both domestically and internationally. We do
this obtaining impulse response functions from the factors under weak identifying
restrictions. We also assess the information content of the individual factors by
measuring their contribution to the forecasting power of the dynamic factor model.
We do this at several critical junctures before and during the crisis, trying to obtain
a pattern causality and propagation.
The idea that transmission of the 1931 financial crisis to the U.S. was important
was emphasized by James (2001, 2009). Coincident with the German banking crisis,
Richardson and van Horn (2008) find a strong increase in financial distress at New
York banks. Accominotti (2009) examined bank balance sheets from London and
found that the German banking crisis was instrumental in weakening the Sterling
and pushing Britain off the Gold Standard. Moure´ (2002) argued that after the end
of Germany’s reparations in August 1932, France’s default on her portion of the
inter-allied debt in 1932, along with her gold withdrawals, seriously worsened the
credit crunch in the U.S. (see also Eichengreen and Flandreau, 2008).
Our results indicate that both monetary and financial transmission mechanisms
were active during the slump. However, financial factors constitute by far the domi-
nant channel of internaitonal crisis propagation, while monetary forces played only a
moderate role (using a DSGE model Cole, Ohanian, and Leung, 2005, obtain related
results). This also holds domestically for both economies, which is consistent with
evidence from a FAVAR model for the U.S. in Amir Ahmadi and Ritschl (2009).
We also find that contrary to expectation, crisis transmission from the U.S. to Ger-
many was comparatively minor. In contrast, we obtain evidence of marked feedback
effects from Germany on the U.S., transmitted mainly through the financial stress
components.
These feedback effects became pronounced around the German crisis of July
1931. We find strong predictive power of Germany’s financial factor for the U.S.
economy, indicating a strong systemic component of the July 1931 crisis. We also
find evidence that shock transmission to the U.S. after the crisis is stronger than
before.
Our results relate closely to research in recent years about foreign debt crises
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and their international spillovers. Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1996) have
identified large output effects of such crises in the defaulting countries as well as
marked spillover effects. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006) have argued that the
U.S. depression of 1929 to 1933 and the subsequent recovery to 1937 bear a lot of
resemblance to foreign-debt-related recessions. With due caution, our results on the
transatlantic spillover of Germany’s financial crisis can be viewed as complementary
to and consistent with this interpretation.
To analyze the issue econometrically, we chose an approach that allows for suffi-
ciently rich dynamics while capturing information from a large number of time series.
Vector autoregression (VAR) analysis alone would not be the adequate tool because
of its limitation to hardly more than a few time series. To exploit the information
imbedded in many disaggregate time series and avoid the curse of dimensionality,
we rely on a dynamic version of factor analysis as e.g. in Forni, Hallin, Lippi, and
Reichlin (2000) or Stock and Watson (2002a,b). As indicated above, we combine the
dynamic factor model with vector autoregressions to analyze the interdependencies
between the estimated latent factors, following the factor augmented vector autore-
gression (FAVAR) approach by Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005). Our version of
the FAVAR model identifies the factors by exclusion restrictions, thus giving them
a structural interpretation (as in Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman, 2003). However, we
do not attempt to identify monetary policy instruments, as the focus of our interest
is less on policy impulses but rather on the channels of transmission themselves.
Our approach to the dynamic factor models is a Bayesian one. We employ Monte
Carlo Markov chain (MCMC) techniques to infer the posterior distributions. Our
choice of a Bayesian framework is motivated by pragmatic considerations regarding
computational convenience, following the lead of Otrok and Whiteman (1998) and
Kim and Nelson (1998). As is implicit in the MCMC methodology, our estimates
are quite robust to changes in the prior; hence our choice of the Bayesian framework
can be regarded as a matter of computational convenience. The Bayesian approach
also suggests itself from our choice of a structural factor model, as Bayesian nu-
merical techniques are particularly robust in the presence of identifying exclusions
restrictions.
Business cycle transmission with recent international data has been analyzed by
structural VARs e.g. in Stock and Watson (2005) and by dynamic factor models in
Eickmeier (2007). To our knowledge, the present paper is the first study applying
modern time series methodology to the international transmission of the interwar
Great Depression. Due to the limitations that existed so far in extending VARs to
panel data, existing econometric work on the international Great Depression, as in
Bernanke and James (1991) and Bernanke and Carey (1996), was confined to cross
section methods.
We structure the evidence by grouping the national time series into nominal and
real series and extracting identified factors specific to these groups under exclusion
restrictions. We find that the real factors we construct from the data coincide well
with traditional business cycle dating schemes and historical national accounts for
the respective countries. This is well in line with the results of Stock and Watson
(1998) on a factor approach towards business cycle dating. We group the nominal
series further by subdividing them into general monetary indicators on the one hand
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and bank specific indicators on the other. The factors we extract from these series
again seem to replicate the historical evidence well.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section characterizes the
dynamic factor model we employ. Section 3 provides the data. Section 4 obtains
the factors and evaluates the relative importance of currency and banking in the
German crisis. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Structural DFA Model
The dynamic factor approach is to to assemble more information than could be
processed by a standard VAR analysis, the workhorse model of empirical macroeco-
nomic analysis. We follow recent developments in dynamic factor analysis that have
augmented VARs with information gathered from a large cross section of time series.
The idea is to aggregate the common components of large time series panels into
synthetic series or factors, which are then used as inputs into a standard VAR. For
each of the two economies in our dataset, we restrict the factor loadings to specific
subsets of the series, monetary, financial, and real.
The data panel Yt , spanning a cross section of N series and an observation
period of length T , is described by the following equation:
Yt = C + Λft + Ut (1)
where ft is a K × 1 vector containing the latent factors, Ut is a N × 1 vector of
variable-specific idiosyncratic components, C is an N × 1 vector of constant terms
and Λ is the N × K coefficient matrix linking the K common factors to the i-th
variable. More precisely, the Λ matrix controls for the structural interpretation of
the factors, where each factor can be loaded on a subset of the data by imposing
zero restrictions. In this context, we define
Λ =
[
ΛUS 0
0 ΛD
]
where
ΛUS =
 Λreal 0 00 Λmonetary 0
0 0 Λfinancial

and
ΛD =
 Λreal 0 00 Λmonetary 0
0 0 Λfinancial

The law of motion for the factors, which is in VAR form, is defined as:
ft = φ1ft−1 + · · ·+ φqft−q + vt, (2)
with vt ∼ N (0,Σ). The idiosyncratic components Ut are assumed to follow an
AR(p) process:
Ut = Θ1Ut−1 + . . .+ ΘpUt−p + χt (3)
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where Θ1, . . . ,Θp are N ×N diagonal matrices and χt ∼ N (0N×1,Ωχ) with
Ωχ =

σ21,χ 0 · · ·
0 σ22,χ
...
... · · · . . .
0 · · · 0
0
...
0
σ2N,χ

To ease the computational burden we quasi difference equation (1). Accordingly
we multiply equation (1) by (I −Θ(L)), where Θ(L) = Θ1 + · · ·+ Θp and I is the
identity matrix, which leads to the following expression:
Y ∗t = C
∗ + Λ∗ft + χt, (4)
where Y ∗t = (I −Θ(L))Yt, Λ∗ = (I −Θ(L))Λ and C∗ = (I −Θ(L))C .
Prior Specification
For the AR-Parameters of the idiosyncratic components Θ1,Θ2, . . . ,Θp we specified
the following prior:
θprior ∼ N (θ, V θ)
where θ = 0p×1 and where
[
V θ
]
= τ1

1 0 · · ·
0 1
2
...
... · · · . . .
0 · · · 0
0
...
0
1
p

We choose τ1 = 0.2. The shrinkage prior we specified implies that we punish more
distant lags. This is applied by subsequently decreasing the uncertainty about the
mean prior belief that the parameters are zero for increasing lag values.
For each of the factor loadings we specified the following prior:
λprior ∼ N (λ, V λ)
where λ = 0 and V λ = 100. For each of the variances of the disturbances in χt we
specified the following prior:
σpriorχ ∼ IG
(
αχ
2
,
δχ
2
)
where we choose αχ = 6 and δχ = 0.001, which implies a fairly loose prior. IG
denotes the inverted gamma distribution.
For the parameters of the VAR equation (2) we follow Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz
(2005) and impose the Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997) Minnesota-type prior on the
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VAR parameters. Then, the prior distribution of the covariance matrix Σ and the
VAR parameters Φ can be expressed by:
Σprior ∼ IW(Σ, K + 2),
with IW representing the inverse Wishart distribution and
vec(Φprior) ∼ N (0,Σprior ⊗G),
where G imposes less weight on more distant lags .
2.1 Estimation
Estimation of the model is via the Gibbs sampler. The principal idea of this algo-
rithm is to break the joint distribution of the model parameters into the conditional
distributions and to proceed by iterating over the conditional distributions. As a
first step, we start by drawing the parameter block Ξ = [Λ,Θ1, . . . ,Θp,Φ,ΩχΣ] and
take values for the factors as given. In the next step we use the obtained draws and
calculate the factors conditional on the realizations of the previous block. These
values of the first Gibbs Sampling step are now used to compute the next step by
iterating through the blocks just mentioned. Iterating over sufficiently many steps,
the simulated frequency distribution converges to the joint distribution at an expo-
nential rate.1. To ensure that the dynamic factor model is uniquely identified, the
upper K×K block of the factor loadings matrix is set to the identity matrix2 where
each diagonal element corresponds to one of the structural factors.
3 Data
Data are at a monthly frequency from September 1925 to November 1932. The U.S.
series are taken from the NBER’s macroeconomic history database, while the Ger-
man data we take from Wagemann (1935). The U.S. data include, among others,
bank debits, deposits, discount rates, steel production, machinery prices, orders of
machinery, as well as an index of industrial production and trade. The German
series are, among others, short term deposits, wholesale and consumer price indices,
currency in circulation, discount rates, domestic orders of machinery, steel produc-
tion, industrial production, and employment in the metal trades. All data except
for the interest rates were standardized and transformed into first differences. For
a more detailed description of the dataset see Appendix B.
4 Results
For the empirical results we choose the lag lengths p = 1, q = 7. We cycled through
30,000 Gibbs iterations. To avoid that our results are driven by the starting values we
1See Geman and Geman (1984) A more detailed description of the estimation procedure is
provided in Appendix A.
2This is again similar to Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005).
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discard the first 10,000 draws of the chain as burn-in. We ensured global convergence
by restarting the algorithm several times over, each time using different starting
values drawn from an overdispersed distribution. Results obtained were very similar.
In each case, the sampler reached convergence already after a few thousand draws.
4.1 Real and Nominal Factors
To add structure to the factor approach, we restrict the data space on which factors
are allowed to load. For both the U.S. and Germany, we identify three factors, one
of them real, the other two nominal. The first factor is designed to capture real
activity in the respective national economies. The two nominal factors load on a
number of currency and banking series, respectively.
(Figure 1 about here)
The real factor for the U.S. loads on output data for investment goods, as well
as a contemporary index of output in manufacturing and trade. The result is shown
in Figure 1(a). This factor is essentially a reflection of traditional business cy-
cle chronologies, and is highly correlated with the most commonly used indices of
industrial production. We found the result to be very robust to changes in the spec-
ification of the time series included. We also notice a very good fit with a broadly
based factor of economic activity calculated in Ritschl, Sarferaz, and Uebele (2008).
Our results confirm the observation by Stock and Watson (1998) that one-factor
models describe the real state of the economy quite well.
The monetary factor for the U.S. in Figure 1(c) loads on different short-term
interest rates. By construction, this factor closely mirrors the increase in short
term interest rates through late 1929, followed by a sharp decline to early 1931. A
pronounced upward shock becomes visible in mid-1931, right around the time of
Germany’s 1931 crisis.
The U.S. banking factor in Figure 1(e) is based on the commonly used banking
statistics from the NBER database. It shows continuing expansion through the
1920s, and reaches its peak with the October 1929 crash. The banking panic of
December 1930 is also visible. Again, there is an additional downward shock in
mid-1931, right after the German crisis.
Figure 1(b) shows the German factor of real activity: fast recovery from a re-
cession in 1925/6 is followed by a marked slowdown in 1927. Real activity peaks in
the summer of 1929, and is already in decline at the time of the New York stock
market crash. A beginning recovery in the first half of 1931 is suddenly chocked off
by a strong downward shock at the time of the German crisis. After a double dip in
summer 1932, recovery set in and was well under way before early 1933, when the
Nazis got to power. All this is in line with conventional wisdom (see Ritschl, 2002a
for a discussion).
The German currency factor in Figure 1(d) is again largely composed of interest
rates. It peaks in mid-1929 and then falls rapidly to reach its trough in mid-1930.
An upward jump is visible in September 1930, after a national election that sharply
increased the Nazi and communist votes. There is some slight improvement before
7
the German crisis of mid-1931 and a huge shock afterwards. Interest rates came
down markedly during 1932, leveling out towards the end of 1932.
The banking factor in Figure 1(f), loading on the banking series in our dataset,
is rather similar to series generated by Schnabel (2004) and Adalet (2005). It shows
almost continuous improvement to March 1929, when a first setback occurred, co-
incident with the first Young Plan crisis (see James, 1985). Recovery to early 1930
was followed by a second setback, coincident with the adoption of the Young Plan,
Schacht’s resignation from the Reichsbank presidency, and the downfall of the last
parliamentary government. After that, the banking factor begins a precipitous de-
cline, which develops into a collapse at the time of the mid-1931 crisis. There is
no recovery until early 1933. Germany’s two nominal factors thus both show a ma-
jor, sudden decline in mid-1931. Eyeballing the evidence from the factors, one may
conclude that both a currency and a banking crisis were at work.
Drawing the evidence from this section together, a common salient feature of
the factors, and thus of the common underlying dynamics of our time series, is the
marked deterioration in mid-1931, at the time of the German crisis. This effect is
not limited to the German data, and is indeed visible also in the factors we extracted
from the U.S. series. The next section will trace the phenomenon further, employing
impulse-response analysis of a structural FAVAR.
4.2 Currency vs. Banking: the Transmission of Shocks
This section relates the above factors to each other in a VAR analysis. As the factors
have a structural interpretation, the dynamic relationships between these factors can
be given a structural interpretation as well. This section analyzes the transmission
of surprise shocks across the two economies using impulse response functions. Our
interest focuses on the relative importance of monetary shocks, transmitted through
the Gold Standard mechanism, and of shocks to the banking system, transmitted
through the mutual exposure of the two countries’ banking systems to each other.
We orthogonalize the shocks using mostly the temporal Cholesky decomposi-
tion. Our principal identification strategy is to assume that the U.S. factors do not
react simultaneously to international conditions, while the German ones do: U.S.
real activity is assumed endogenous to U.S. monetary and banking conditions only.
German currency conditions are assumed endogenous to U.S. factors but exogenous
to German banking conditions. We furthermore assume that German real were
endogenous to all other factors.
The only exception to this identification strategy is the propagation of shocks to
the U.S. interest and banking factors, for which we adopt the agnostic sign restriction
approach of Uhlig (2005). The idea is to focus only on those results that yield
plausible impulse responses for the nominal side of the economy, while being agnostic
with regard to the response of real activity in the economy. Uhlig (2005) suggested
this approach as an alternative to the recursive Cholesky identification in order
to avoid sign puzzles in the response of nominal series to a monetary shock at
short horizons. Such sign puzzles would abound in impulse responses obtained via
the Cholesky decomposition from U.S. interwar data, which makes the use of an
alternative approach compelling.
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To identify the responses to nominal shocks, we present results for two alternative
sets of sign restrictions. In a baseline identification, we restrict the responses of both
the U.S. monetary and the U.S. banking factor to a nominal shock to be negative
for six months. No sign restriction operates on the responses of real activity in both
countries to a nominal shock. We also experiment with a departure from Uhlig’s
(2005) agnostic approach toward the response of real activity and employ a stronger
identification, restricting the response of U.S. output to be negative as well.
To account for the potential effects of the German crisis of July 1931, we also
run the FAVAR analysis of this section separately for a truncated observation pe-
riod from 1925 to May 1931, cutting off just before the onset of the financial crisis.
Comparison of the impulse response functions from the full and truncated sample
allows us to draw additional conclusions about the possible impact of the 1931 crisis.
4.2.1 Full Observation Period
Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions and the error bands for adverse shocks
to U.S. real activity. Such shocks tended to be quite persistent. They were trans-
mitted to the U.S. monetary factor, which exhibits a marked downward response of
interest rates. Strong adverse effects on U.S. banking conditions existed as well. On
average, around 40% of the forecast error variance in the U.S. banking factor is ex-
plained by real shocks, albeit with substantial error margins. The German economy
shows similar responses to real shocks on U.S. economy, albeit in weakened form.
(Figures 2 and 3 about here)
To identify the effects of nominal shocks to the U.S. economy, we proceed in two
steps. Figure 4 shows the responses to an adverse nominal shock, were the responses
of both the monetary and the banking factors for the U.S. are restricted to be
negative for six months. Under this baseline, the responses of Germany’s nominal
factors over the same horizon are negative as well. This seems like a desirable
property: an identified nominal shock to the U.S. operates like a global nominal
shock, the two are observationally equivalent.
The real factor in both economies also respond in almost identical fashion, how-
ever with less desirable properties. The median response of U.S. real activity over
a six-month horizon is just negative, indicating that almost 50% of the draws are
positive. The response of German real activity to a nominal shock is equally diffuse,
again with almost half of the probability mass in the positive orthant. For both
countries, the forecast error variance in real activity explained by the nominal shock
is minimal, averaging less than 10%, see Figure 5.
(Figures 4 and 5 about here)
To achieve sharper results for the real responses to nominal shocks, we depart for
a moment from Uhlig’s (2005) agnostic stance on output responses and force the
response of U.S. real activity to be negative for six months after a nominal shock.
This additional constraint allows us to identify shocks to monetary conditions and
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to the banking factor separately.
Figure 6 shows the responses to tightening conditions in the U.S. money market
(although not necessarily to monetary policy itself). By construction, the response
of U.S. real activity is now negative for six months. This sign restriction is a bind-
ing constraint. In its absence, the response of the U.S. real factor to a monetary
shock would have been positive throughout. On average, U.S. banking responds
negatively for most horizons, although large parts of the probability mass indicate
positive responses. As suspected by Bernanke (1983), monetary factors have only
limited explanatory power for financial conditions: hardly more than 10% of the
forecast error variation in the U.S. banking factor are explained by the U.S. interest
factor. This result was very robust under a variety of different specifications of both
the monetary and the ban king factors. The sign restriction on the monetary factor
itself is again binding: as soon as the constraint is lifted, the response turns into
negative territory. The responses of the German factors are similar to their U.S.
counterparts but on the whole appear more diffuse.
(Figures 6 and 8 about here)
(Figures 7 and 9 about here)
The forecast error decompositions in Figure 7 suggest a share of 10-20% for nominal
tightening in explaining the variance of U.S. real activity. This appears to confirm
results of Sims (1999) in a longitudinal study of U.S. monetary policy in the 20th
century, as well as of Amir Ahmadi and Ritschl (2009) from a FAVAR model for
U.S. monetary policy during the Great Depression.
Figure 8 shows the responses to tightening financial conditions. Again obtained
under sign restrictions, the shocks are quite persistent and also translate into per-
sistent real effects. However, the response of real activity in the U.S. is negative for
the first six months by construction. After that, it remains negative on average, but
draws with positive responses do occur, indicating that the restriction is binding.
Lifting the constraint, the responses would be positive throughout. As before, the
German responses are structurally similar but more diffuse.
The forecast error decompositions in Figure 9 suggest that about 15 % of the
variation in the real factor can be explained by shocks to financial conditions, which
is slightly higher than for monetary shocks.
(Figures 10 and 12 about here)
(Figures 11 and 13 about here)
Next we look at the effects of shocks to the German factors. As would be expected,
a shock to real activity in Germany (see Figure 10) is persistent domestically but
has no discernible effect on the U.S. economy. Shocks to German money market
conditions, shown in Figure 12, propagate through the German economy without
sign puzzles and have real effects. However, their contribution to the forecast error
variance of the German real factor is low (see Figure 13).
Monetary market tightening in Germany has near-significant effects on real con-
ditions in the U.S., yet their contribution to forecast error variance is negligible
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(see Figure 13). The effect of nominal tightening in Germany on U.S. monetary
conditions is briefly negative and significant but then turns into positive, however
without being significant. There is also a negative but insignificant effect on the
U.S. banking environment. Both effects would be consistent with the classical gold
standard mechanism, however in a slightly non-standard way: it almost looks as
if the U.S. played the role of a monetary shock absorber for the international gold
standard, much like the Bank of England in the pre-World War I years.
The same direction of causality becomes visible for adverse shocks to the Ger-
man banking factor. Figure 14 shows persistent and significant effects on U.S. real
activity as well as on U.S. banking conditions, while the effect on the U.S. interest
factor is hump-shaped and changes signs. This effect of German banking conditions
on U.S. conditions has hardly been studied so far; we found it to be robust under a
large variety of alternative specifications. A look at the variance decompositions in
Figure 15 shows a high contribution of Germany’s banking factors to the forecast
error variance of the German real factor. With a delay of about ten months, marked
effects also build up on the variance of the U.S. real and banking factors.
(Figures 14 and 15 about here)
This result would lend support to the hypothesis of James (2001) that the deep-
ening of the U.S. recession in 1931 was at least partly triggered by the international
repercussions of the 1931 crisis in Austria and Germany. The variance decompo-
sitions in Figure 15 show that after two years, the cumulative effects of shocks to
Germany’s banking conditions on the U.S. real factor are markedly higher than for
the U.S. monetary and banking factors in Fig. 6 and 8 above.
4.2.2 Truncated Observation Period, 1925 to June 1931
To identify the contribution of the 1931 crisis to this surprising result, we truncate
the observation period to end in May 1931. Figure 16 shows the responses to German
currency shocks for this subperiod. A surprising countercyclical pattern emerges:
adverse monetary shocks in Germany have mostly adverse effects on German real
activity in banking, but significant, favorable effects on real conditions in the U.S. In
contrast, in this truncated sample from before the crisis, all responses to an adverse
shock to German banking (in Figure 18) have roughly the same characteristics as for
the whole sample (in Figure 14) but are less significant and have less explanatory
power for forecast error variance. Evidently, the German crisis of 1931 sharpens
the results. The financial accelerator effects of Germany’s 1931 crisis on the U.S.
economy must have been considerable.
(Figures 16 and 17 about here)
(Figures 18 and 19 about here)
Drawing the results of this section together, our application of a dynamic factor
model finds little evidence for the traditional view that U.S. monetary or banking
problems were key in explaining the depression in either country. We find only scant
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support for a transmission of the recession from the U.S. to Germany through either
monetary of financial channels of transmission. We also notice that nominal shocks
to the U.S. economy do not play a dominant role in explaining the variation of real
activity.
Conversely, we do find significant effects of Germany’s nominal shocks on real
activity in the U.S. economy. Again the monetary channel is of relatively minor
importance. Transmission through the banking channel, however, comes out as
quantitatively important and highly persistent. The effects have not fully built up
after 20 months, and would explain 30% in the variance of both U.S. real activity
and the U.S. banking factor.
However, most of these effects did apparently not really materialize before the
1931 crisis. Truncating the observation period to end in May 1931, we find the re-
sponses to Germany’s nominal conditions to be less pronounced and less significant.3
This implies that transmission from Germany to the U.S. is strongest in the period
after July 1931. We conclude that international spillovers from the German crisis
of 1931 were a significant force in deepening the U.S. recession.
We also find that while nominal factors seem to have played a rather minor role
in the U.S. recession, the overall role of nominal factors in the German recession
seems somewhat stronger. Responses of German real activity to adverse shocks
in German monetary and banking conditions are estimated precisely and without
having to resort to sign restrictions. In the case of financial shocks, they are also
quantitatively important, accounting for a third of the forecast error variance in
German real activity. Again, the explanatory power of monetary shocks is much
lower: the explained variation in German real activity is only about 10%.
The results so far imply that banking conditions played a dominant role in the
German crisis of 1931. As a corollary, if there was a financial frictions channel of
transatlantic business cycle transmission in the Great Depression, it originated in
Germany rather than in the U.S., and affected both economies significantly. This is
consistent with the claim by Harold James (2001) that the German banking crisis
had major spillover effects on the international economy. It is also consistent with
the claim of James (1986) and Schnabel (2004) that Germany’s 1931 crisis was
causally a banking crisis, while monetary transmission under the Gold Standard
played only a secondary role.
4.3 Currency vs. Banking: the Systematic Effects
Thus far, attention has focused on the transmission of surprise shocks. In the
following section, we examine possible systematic effects that may have been factored
into expectations. Systematic components included in the agents’ information set
at time t would be reflected in the accuracy of forecasts made on the basis of that
information set. In this section we obtain forecasts of real activity in Germany and
the U.S., conditional on the information at critical junctures before and during the
1931 crisis. To evaluate the information content of the banking factor at any of these
points in time, we obtain each forecast twice, once from a bivariate VAR including
3The more direct test of obtaining the results for the subperiod from June 1931 to March 1933
would not be feasible due to missing degrees of freedom in specifying the model
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the banking sector, once from a univariate AR of the same lag length in the real
activity factor alone.
4.3.1 Germany
Univariate forecasts for the German real factor from March and May 1931 predict
recovery, extrapolating from the green shoots that had become visible in early 1931.
The forecasts are quite imprecise, though, with widely diverging error bands. Only
if the update from July 1931, after the crisis, is incorporated does the univariate
forecast predict a further downturn.
(Figure 20 about here)
To evaluate the gain in forecasting power from the information content in the bank-
ing factor, we now add the German Banking series and perform bivariate conditional
forecasts for the same three truncated samples.
(Figure 21 about here)
The forecast of the German real sector from March 1931 already predicts further
downturn, although large parts of the probability mass are still predicting a fur-
ther increase. The forecast for May 1931 is much more unequivocal about a further
decrease. Comparing this forecast to the univariate forecast for May in Figure
20 above, the banking series turns out to be highly informative about a renewed
downturn. German banking variables up to May 1931 clearly predict a major dete-
rioration before the July 1931 crisis. If the update to the banking series for July is
included, we obtain a full prediction of the decline in real activity through mid-1931
(in Figure 21(c)).
No comparable gain in predictive power is obtained if we include monetary in-
stead of banking variables in the forecasts. Results in Figure 22 show little improve-
ment over the univariate forecast of real activity in Figure 20 above.
(Figure 22 about here)
Only if the information from July 1931 is incorporated does the bivariate forecast
including monetary information predict the further decline in activity correctly.
These results confirm the evidence from the impulse response analysis in the pre-
vious section: the domestic driving force behind Germany’s 1931 crisis was the weak-
ness of its banking system. The deterioration in banking conditions foreshadowed
the July 1931 crisis, and indeed has considerably predictive power. By comparison,
domestic monetary conditions play only a secondary role.
No predictive power for German real activity is gained from including U.S. rather
than German monetary and banking data in the forecasts before the July 1931 crisis.
(Figure 24 about here)
(Figure 25 about here)
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Indeed it is noteworthy how the inclusion of the U.S. monetary factor tends to
buttress the prediction of a continuing upswing in Spring 1931. Even after the be-
ginning of crisis in July, the forecasts conditional on U.S. data are more optimistic
than the univariate forecast in Figure 20 above. According to these results, U.S.
data are uninformative about the German financial crisis; there is no indication that
the 1931 crisis was triggered by conditions in the U.S.
4.3.2 U.S.
In Figure 27 we show forecasts for the U.S. real sector as of March 1931. As can
be seen, they predict rather a stagnation than a further deterioration of the U.S.
economy.
(Figure 27 about here)
The noteworthy exception is the forecast including the monetary factor, which pre-
dicts fast recovery. This would indicate that money market conditions were not a
constraining factor in the spring of 1931.
Figure 28 shows the forecasts from May 1931 on. The univariate forecast is now
more pessimistic, and the bivariate forecast including banking conditions is even
more so. These are clear signs of mounting banking distress in the U.S. before the
July 1931 crisis. In contrast, the forecast including monetary factors is again point-
ing to an imminent recovery.
(Figure 28 about here)
The forecasts from July 1931 confirm this result. Again, the bivariate forecast
including banking activity is more pessimistic than the univariate forecast. It is also
closer to the actual trajectory of real activity after the crisis. The forecast including
monetary conditions once again comes out as more optimistic, signaling an end to
the recession and a return to recovery in 1932.
(Figure 29 about here)
Again we examine mechanisms of transatlantic business cycle transmission, this
time tracking possible anticipation and contagion effects of the German financial
crisis on the U.S. Figure 30 shows bivariate forecasts of U.S. real activity from May
1931 including the German banking and monetary factors, respectively.
(Figure 30 about here)
The bivariate forecast of U.S. real activity using the German banking factor up
until May 1931 is as pessimistic as the forecast using the U.S. banking factor in
Figure 28 above. This result implies that German banking conditions in May 1931
were informative about U.S. real activity. In contrast, the German currency factor
adds no predictive power and essentially reproduces the univariate forecast of U.S.
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real activity in Figure 28 above.
For July 1931, including data from immediately after the German financial crisis
we obtain a very similar result.
(Figure 31 about here)
German banking data are again highly informative about U.S. real activity; they
now actually predict the further downturn slightly better than the bivariate forecast
using the U.S. banking factor in Figure 29 above. In contrast, using German mone-
tary information again fails to predict U.S. real activity and signals a swift (though
short-lived) recovery.
In sum, we find that banking conditions in both the U.S. and Germany have
considerable predictive power for real activity in mid-1931, while monetary factors
do not. However, U.S. banking conditions have very little predictive power for
German real activity, while the German banking factor is highly informative about
U.S. real activity. This evidence would be difficult to reconcile with an interpretation
of the 1931 financial crisis as a primarily monetary phenomenon, or as contagion
of distress originating in the U.S. banking system. It is consistent, however, with
the interpretation that the German financial crisis of 1931 was primarily rooted
in Germany’s national banking system and had strong adverse effects on the U.S.
economy as well.
5 Conclusion
This paper assessed the relative importance, both domestic and international, of
Gold Standard transmission vs. banking channels in the origins and the propagation
of the German financial crisis of 1931. To identify channels of crisis causation and
propagation, we employed a structural dynamic factor model of the interactions
between the U.S. and the German economy between 1925 and 1932. To this end we
restricted the model to yield structural factors representing banking and monetary
conditions the U.S. and the German separately. We also included one real factor
for each of the two economies. Our real factors appear to trace established business
cycle chronologies very well. Our nominal factors for Germany suggest that both
monetary and banking conditions in Germany deteriorated severely and persistently
in the 1931 crisis.
The first main result of this paper is that the overall transmission of nominal
shocks from the U.S. to the German economy was insignificant and quantitatively
negligible. This implies only weak support for the conventional wisdom that mon-
etary and banking conditions in the U.S. transmitted the Great Depression to the
rest of the world. In spite of our use of a broad database, we do not detect the U.S.
causation of the international depression that has been taken for granted in much
of the traditional literature. In contrast, we find remarkably high transmission of
shocks in U.S. real activity to the German economy.
A second main result of this study is that in both countries, the influence of
domestic monetary conditions on real activity was weak. Neither surprise effects
nor any systematic effects appear to play a significant role. This result proved
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robust under a large variety of different specifications we experimented with.
The third main result of this paper is that banking conditions constitute a im-
portant channel of domestic propagation and international transmission of the Great
Depression, confirming the central claim of Bernanke (1983). We find that banking
conditions cannot be explained by monetary conditions but themselves have marked
real effects. The domestic financial channel comes out stronger in Germany but is
also present in the U.S. International transmission through the financial channel
was from Germany to the U.S., from the periphery to the core. This effect comes
out stronger after the 1931 crisis. We have argued in this paper that the U.S. was
strongly exposed to the German economy through credit, and indirectly through
reparations that collateralized inter-Allied war credits. Germany’s banking system
suffered a meltdown in mid-1931, which made this vulnerability visible. In the pro-
cess, the U.S. lost loans to Germany and Europe that equaled Germany’s GDP
in 1931, or roughly on quarter of U.S. GDP in the same year. The collapse of
Germany’s financial position in 1931 was a key event in turning the international
recession into an unprecedented economic disaster.
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A Estimation
A.1 Estimating the Parameter Block
In this section we condition on the factors ft. Because equation (1) is set of N
independent regressions with autoregressive error terms it is possible to estimate Λ,
Θ1,Θ2, . . . ,Θp, Ωχ and Ω equation by equation.
4 We rewrite equation (3) as:
ui = Xi,uθi + χi (5)
where ui = [ui,p+1 ui,p+2 . . . ui,T ]
′ is T − p× 1, θi = [θi,1 θi,2 . . . θi,p]′, is p× 1 and
χi = [χi,p+1 χi,p+2 . . . χi,T ]
′ is T − p× 1 and
Xi,u =

ui,p ui,p−1 · · ·
ui,p+1 ui,p · · ·
...
...
...
ui,T−1 ui,T−2 · · ·
ui,1
ui,2
...
ui,T−p

which is a T − p× p for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Combining the priors described in section 2 with the likelihood function we ob-
tain the following posterior distributions.
The posterior of the AR-parameters of the idiosyncratic components is:
θi ∼ N(θi, V i,θ)ISθ (6)
where
θi =
(
Vθ
−1 + (σ2i,χ)
−1X ′i,uXi,u
)−1 (
V −1θ θ + (σ
2
i,χ)
−1X ′i,uui
)
and
V i,θ =
(
V −1θ + (σ
2
i,χ)
−1X ′i,uXi,u
)−1
.
where ISθ is an indicator function enforcing stationarity.
The posterior of the variance of the idiosyncratic component σi,χ is:
σi,χ ∼ IG
(
(T + αχ)
2
,
((ui −Xiθi)′(ui −Xiθi) + δχ)
2
)
(7)
To estimate the factor loadings we rewrite equation (1) as:
y∗i = c
∗
i + λif
∗ + χ (8)
where y∗i = [(1− θ(L)i)yi,p+1 (1− θ(L)i)yi,p+2 . . . (1− θ(L)i)yi,T ]′ which is T − p× 1,
c∗i = ci(1 − θ(L)i) and f ∗ = [(1 − θ(L)i)fp+1 (1 − θ(L)i)fp+2 . . . (1 − θ(L)i)fT ]′,
which T − p× 1 with θ(L)i = (θi,1 + θi,2 + · · · + θi,p) for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Thus, the
posterior for the factor loadings is:
λi ∼ N(λi, V i,λ) (9)
4See also Chib (1993).
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where
λi =
(
V −1λ + (σ
2
i,χ)
−1f ∗′f ∗
)−1 (
V −1λ λ+ (σ
2
i,χ)
−1f ∗′y∗i
)
and
V i,λ =
(
V −1λ + (σ
2
i,χ)
−1f ∗′f ∗
)−1
.
To estimate the VAR parameters of the factors φ1, φ2, . . . , φq we find it useful to
rewrite equation (2) as:
f = Xfφ+ ν (10)
where f = [fq+1 fq+2 . . . fT ]
′ is T − q × K, φ = [φ1 φ2 . . . φq]′ is Kq × K,
ν = [νq+1 νq+2 . . . νT ]
′ is T − q ×K and
Xf =

fq fq−1 · · ·
fq+1 fq · · ·
...
...
...
fT−1 fT−2 · · ·
f1
f2
...
fT−q

which is T − q×Kq. Thus, the posterior of the VAR parameters can be drawn from
the following distribution:
vec(Φ) ∼ N (vec(Φ¯),Σ⊗G)ISΦ ,
where Φ¯ ≡ G(Xf ′Xf )Φˆ and G = (G−1 + Xf ′Xf )−1. where ISΦ is an indicator
function enforcing stationarity.
A.2 Estimating the Latent Factors
To estimate the common latent factor we condition on the parameters of the model.5
Our observation equation in the following state-space system is:
Y ∗t = C
∗ +HFt + χt (11)
where
H = [Λ −Θ1Λ −Θ2Λ . . . ΘpΛ 0N×K(q−p−1)]
Our state equation is:
Ft = ΦFt−1 + ν˜t (12)
where Ft = [ft, ft−1, . . . , ft−q+1]′ is Kq × 1, which is denoted as the state vector,
ν˜t = [νt 0 . . . 0]
′ is Kq × 1 and
Φ =
[
φ1 φ2 · · ·
IK(q−1)
φq
0K(q−1)×K
]
which is Kq ×Kq. For all empirical results shown below we use q > p.
5See also Kim and Nelson (1999)
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To calculate the common factor we use the algorithm suggested by Carter and
Kohn (1994) and Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (1994) . This procedure draws the vector
F = [F1 F2 . . . FT ] from its joint distribution given by:
p(F |Ξ, Y ) = p(FT |Ξ, yT )
T−1∏
t=1
p(Ft|Ft+1,Ξ, Y t) (13)
where Ξ = [Λ,Θ1, . . . ,Θp,Φ,Σ,Ωchi] and Y
t = [Y1 Y2 . . . Yt]. Because the error
terms in equations (11) and (12) are Gaussian equation (13)can be rewritten as:
p(F |Λ, Y,Ξ) = N (FT |T , PT |T )
T−1∏
t=1
N (Ft|t,Ft+1 , Pt|t,Ft+1) (14)
with
FT |T = E(FT |Λ,Ξ, Y ) (15)
PT |T = Cov(FT |Λ,Ξ, Y ) (16)
and
Ft|t,Ft+1 = E(Ft|Ft+1,Λ,Ξ, Y ) (17)
Pt|t,Ft+1 = Cov(Ft|Ft+1,Λ,Ξ, Y ) (18)
We obtain FT |T and PT |T from the last step of the Kalman filter iteration and
use them as the conditional mean and covariance matrix for the multivariate normal
distributionN (FT |T , PT |T ) to draw FT . To illustrate the Kalman Filter we work with
the state-space system equations (11) and (12). We begin with the prediction steps:
Ft|t−1 = ΦFt−1|t−1 (19)
Pt|t−1 = ΦPt−1|t−1Φ +Q (20)
where
Q =

Σ 0 · · ·
0 0 · · ·
...
...
. . .
0 0 · · ·
0
0
...
0

which is Kq×Kq. To update these predictions we first have to derive the forecast
error:
κt = Y
∗
t − C∗ −HFt|t−1 (21)
its variance:
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Σ = HPt|t−1H ′ + Ωχ (22)
and the Kalman gain:
Kt = Pt|t−1H ′Σ−1. (23)
Thus, the updating equations are:
Ft|t = Ft|t−1 +Ktκt, (24)
Pt|t = Pt|t−1 +KtHPt|t−1, (25)
To obtain draws for F1, F2, . . . , FT−1 we sample from N (Ft|t,Ft+1 , Pt|t,Ft+1), using
a backwards moving updating scheme, incorporating at time t information about Ft
contained in period t + 1. More precisely, we move backwards and generate Ft for
t = T −1, . . . , p+ 1 at each step while using information from the Kalman filter and
Ft+1 from the previous step. We do this until p+ 1 and calculate f1, f2, . . . , fp in an
one-step procedure.
The updating equations are:
Ft|t,Ft+1 = Ft|t + Pt|tΦ
′P−1t+1|t(Ft+1 − Ft+1|t) (26)
and
Pt|t,Ft+1 = Pt|t − Pt|tΦ′P−1t+1|tΦPt|t (27)
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B Data
Series Mnemonic
1 U.S. Steel Production m01135a
2 U.S. Index of Industrial Production and Trade, Seasonally Adjusted m12004c
3 U.S. Index of Orders for Machinery Tools and Forging Machinery m06029
4 U.S. Index of Production Of Machinery, Seasonally Adjusted m01277b
5 U.S. Index of Consumer Goods m01056
6 U.S. Loans On Securities, Reporting Member Banks, Federal Reserve System m14074
7 U.S. All Other Loans, Reporting Member Banks, Federal Reserve System m14075a
8 U.S. Index of Deposit Activity m12008b
9 U.S. Bank Debits m12030
10 U.S. Clearings Index of Business m12020b
11 U.S. Commercial Paper Rate m13002
12 U.S. Discount Rates m13009
13 U.S. Ninety Day Time-Money Rates On Stock Exchange Loans m13003
14 German Orders of Machines –
15 German Steel Production –
16 German Industrial Production –
17 German Employment in Metal Trade Sector –
18 German Savings Deposits –
19 German Demand Deposits –
20 German Creditors –
21 German Stocks of Bills of Exchange –
22 German Debtors –
23 German Discount Rates –
24 German Private Discount Rates –
25 German Warenwechsel –
Source: German data are taken from Wagemann (1935). U.S. data are taken from the NBER
macro history database, www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents/.
25
C Figures
C.1 Latent Common Components
(a) U.S. real
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
−5
0
5
10
15
20
(b) German real
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
(c) U.S. monetary
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
(d) German monetary
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
(e) U.S. banking
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
−5
0
5
10
15
20
25
(f) German banking
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Figure 1: Latent common components for the U.S. and German real, monetary and
financial variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded
area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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C.2 Impulse Response Analysis (1925:9–1932:11)
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Figure 2: Responses of all variables to a contractionary shock of one standard devi-
ation in size in the common component of U.S. real variables. The dark gray shaded
area represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 3: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary shock in the com-
mon component of U.S. real variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68%
and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 4: Responses of all variables to a contractionary nominal shock. The dark
gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior
probability mass. A sign restriction operates on the responses of the U.S. interest
and banking factors for the first six months after the shock.
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Figure 5: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary nominal shock.
The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the
posterior probability mass.
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Figure 6: Responses of all variables to a contractionary shock of one standard devi-
ation in size in the U.S. monetary factor. The dark gray shaded area represents 68%
and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass. A sign restriction
operates on the responses of the U.S. real and the U.S. banking factors for the first
six months after the shock.
31
1 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
 US Real
1 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
 US Interest
1 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
 US Banking
1 5 10 15 20
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
 D Interest
1 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
 D Banking
1 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
 D Real
Figure 7: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary shock in the com-
mon component of U.S. interest rates. The dark gray shaded area represents 68%
and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 8: Responses of all variables to a contractionary shock of one standard de-
viation in size in the common component of U.S. financial variables. The dark gray
shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior proba-
bility mass. A sign restriction operates on the responses of the U.S. real and the
U.S. monetary factors for the first six months after the shock.
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Figure 9: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary shock in the com-
mon component of U.S. financial variables. The dark gray shaded area represents
68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 10: Responses of all variables to a contractionary shock of one standard
deviation in size in the common component of German real variables. The dark
gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior
probability mass.
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Figure 11: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary shock in the
common component of German real variables. The dark gray shaded area represents
68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 12: Responses of all variables to a contractionary shock of one standard
deviation in size in the common component of German monetary variables. The
dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior
probability mass.
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Figure 13: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary shock in the
common component of German interest rates. The dark gray shaded area represents
68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 14: Responses of all variables to a contractionary shock of one standard
deviation in size in the common component of German financial variables. The
dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior
probability mass.
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Figure 15: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary shock in the
common component of German financial variables. The dark gray shaded area
represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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C.3 Impulse Response Analysis (1925:9 to 1931:5)
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Figure 16: Responses of all variables to a contractionary shock of one standard
deviation in size in the common component of German monetary variables when
sample period is truncated to 1931:5. The dark gray shaded area represents 68%
and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 17: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary shock in the
common component of German monetary variables when sample period is truncated
to 1931:5. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded area 90%
of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 18: Responses of all variables to a contractionary shock of one standard
deviation in size in the common component of German financial variables when
sample period is truncated to 1931:5. The dark gray shaded area represents 68%
and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 19: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary shock in the
common component of German financial variables when sample period is truncated
to 1931:5. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded area 90%
of the posterior probability mass.
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C.4 Forecasting the Depression
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Figure 20: Forecasting the German real sector from March 1931, May 1931 and July
1931, using German real variables only. The dark gray shaded area represents 68%
and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 21: Forecasting the German real sector from March 1931, May 1931 and
July 1931, using German real and banking variables. The dark gray shaded area
represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 22: Forecasting the German real sector from March 1931, May 1931 and July
1931, using German real variables and interest rates. The dark gray shaded area
represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 23: Forecasting the German real sector from March 1931, May 1931 and July
1931, using German and U.S. real variables. The dark gray shaded area represents
68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 24: Forecasting the German real sector from March 1931, May 1931 and July
1931, using German real and U.S. banking variables. The dark gray shaded area
represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 25: Forecasting the German real sector from March 1931, May 1931 and
July 1931, using German real and U.S. interest rates. The dark gray shaded area
represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 26: Forecasting the U.S. real sector from March 1931, May 1931 and July
1931, using U.S. real variables only. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and
the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 27: Forecasting the U.S. real sector from March 1931, using U.S. real, bank-
ing, and monetary variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the
light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 28: Forecasting the U.S. real sector from May 1931, using U.S. real, banking,
and monetary variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light
shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 29: Forecasting the U.S. real sector from July 1931, using U.S. real, banking,
and monetary variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light
shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 30: Forecasting the U.S. real sector from May 1931, using German banking
and monetary variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light
shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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(a) U.S. Real and German Banking, July 1931
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
(b) U.S. Real and German Monetary, July 1931
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
−5
0
5
10
15
20
Figure 31: Forecasting the U.S. real sector from July 1931, using German banking
and monetary variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light
shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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